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Abstract. This paper presents a security review of the mobile apps provided
by the UK’s leading banks; we focus on the connections the apps make, and
the way in which TLS is used. We apply existing TLS testing methods to the
apps which only find errors in legacy apps. We then go on to look at exten-
sions of these methods and find five of the apps have serious vulnerabilities. In
particular, we find that two apps pin a TLS root CA certificate, but do not
verify the hostname. In this case, the use of certificate pinning means that all
existing test methods would miss detecting the hostname verification flaw. We
find that three apps load adverts over insecure connections, which could be
exploited for in-app phishing attacks. Some of the apps used the users’ PIN as
authentication, for which PCI guidelines require extra security, so these apps
use an additional cryptographic protocol; we study the underlying protocol of
one banking app in detail and show that it provides little additional protec-
tion, meaning that an active man-in-the-middle attacker can retrieve the user’s
credentials, login to the bank and perform every operation the legitimate user
could.
1 Introduction
The use of TLS in smartphone apps has proved challenging for developers to get right.
Common mistakes involve accepting self signed certificates, not checking the hostname,
accepting weak cipher suites and allowing SSL stripping due to sending HTTPS links
over insecure connections [4,9,12]. These issues are all trivial to fix and easy to detect
so we would expect that leading international banks would not make such mistakes.
Banking organisations have previously threatened legal action against security re-
searchers [6,18] and the UK courts have granted temporary injunctions against re-
searchers on the grounds that they could not show that they followed proper proce-
dure in their analysis [5]. Therefore, when carrying our work it would be useful to
be able to follow all of the terms and conditions of use of the apps, failure to do so
could lead to legal pressure not to publish the results of the analysis. In particular, the
terms and conditions of the banking apps and app store, forbid reverse engineering
the code, and accessing app stores outside of your geographical area. We note that our
analysis method does not require this and allows analysis without breaking the terms
and conditions of the app.
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A correctly configured TLS client should check (among other things) that the server
it communicates with uses a certificate for the hostname the client is expecting, and
that this certificate is signed by someone the client trusts. Additionally, it is good
practice for the client to check that the certificate is signed by a single, prearranged
Certificate Authority (CA), rather than an arbitrary CA from the list of those trusted
by the client’s OS. This additional check is known as certificate pinning. There are a
number of options as to which certificate in the chain is being pinned to: pinning the
server certificate provides the highest security level but it also provides less flexibility,
e.g., when this key expires or needs to be revoked. Alternatively, it is possible to pin
the intermediate or even the root CA. The higher in the chain you pin, the more
flexibility you get at the cost of security.
In this paper we report on the analysis of Android and iOS apps from 15 of the
leading retail banks based in the UK (see Table 1). We test all of the apps for the most
common TLS flaws, i.e. whether they accept self-signed certificates; correctly check the
hostname; permit protocol downgrades or weak cipher suites; allow SSL stripping (by
sending secure links over insecure connections); Using available tools and previous
defined methods we found no vulnerabilities in any of current versions of the apps.
However, we note that as one of our test devices was an old Apple tablet that did
not support the most recent version of iOS. We found that when apps were downloaded
on these older devices, an older legacy version of the app was provided. In fact, two
of the legacy apps accepted self-signed certificates, and using this an attacker could
steal the initial setup code used to authenticate the app, which is generated during
the registration process. It seems likely that this was a flaw in the application that
had been previously detected and fixed, but fixing the legacy version of the app had
been overlooked.
While checking the up-to-date apps, we found that 8 of the 15 banks we tested
used certificate pinning, as we might expect from high security apps. We note that
the method of checking that apps are verifying server hostnames used by others [9] is
unreliable when certificate pinning is being used. This is because by proxying TLS con-
nections with a trusted certificate for an unrelated hostname, one cannot distinguish
whether the app rejects the connection because the hostname is invalid, or because a
chain of trust cannot be established due to pinning being in use.
While pinning to the server public key would be secure, to test for apps that
pinned to higher up the certificate chain, we obtained a free Comodo certificate for
our own hostname and found that this certificate was accepted by apps from Natwest
and Co-op bank, meaning that these apps could be MITMed and were not secure.
While pinning the certificates is good security practice, it seems possible that in the
case of these apps, pinning the certificate hid the more serious problem of having no
hostname verification. The banks involved all have rigorous security testing regimes,
and during the disclosure process they told us that they had also hired leading outside
penetration companies to test the apps; however the certificate pinning would have
meant that many of the standard penetration tests on apps (such as trying to MITM
with a valid certificate for the same hostname) would have failed. While high security
apps should certainly continue to pin the certificates, care must be taken to ensure
that this does not mean that other vulnerabilities are missed.
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App Name Vulnerabilities
Accepts any certifi-
cate (self-signed or
any hostname)
Pinning, but no
hostname validation
In-app phishing Broken second
layer protocol
Natwest Legacy 7 7
Lloyds 7 7 7 7
RBS Legacy 7 7 7
Barclays 7 7 7 7
Co-Op 7 7
HSBC 7 7 7 7
Nationwide 7 7 7 7
Santander UK 7 7 7
TSB 7 7 7 7
Halifax 7 7 7 7
Metro 7 7 7 7
Tesco 7 7 7 7
Clydesdale 7 7 7 7
First Trust 7 7 7
Allied Irish (GB) 7 7 7
Table 1: Apps in our test set and vulnerabilities discovered.
When examining the apps we also found that some apps which passed all of the
TLS checks, requested some of their data over unencrypted connections. While not
a vulnerability in itself, a few of the apps were requesting images with links to be
displayed to the user. We found this vulnerability in apps from Allied Irish Bank and
Santander UK, among others. We additionally found unencrypted update checks which
could be used to make the app tell the user that they needed to upgrade and redirect
them to a site of the attacker’s choosing, e.g. a phishing website.
When examining apps with failed TLS, we discovered that some apps use an addi-
tional layer of security. Requirement 1 of the PCI PIN security regulations [15] states
that PINs must never appear in the clear outside of an SCD. If this is applied to
mobile banking application PINs, it would make a second layer protocol compulsory.
Web servers that decrypt TLS tra c from these apps are unlikely to be Secure Cryp-
tographic Devices (SCD). Therefore there is a need to implement a second layer secure
protocol so that PIN data can be forwarded to the banks’ SCDs for processing. Fur-
ther to this, new attacks have frequently been discovered against TLS so an additional
layer of security is a sensible precaution. We found that some of the apps did use an
additional cryptographic protocol on top of TLS, however we show that this proto-
col is flawed, allowing an adversary to obtain the information needed to log into the
victim’s online banking. We go on to propose an alternative protocol that would keep
mobile banking secure even when the TLS protection failed and we formally verify this
protocol.
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Summary of our contribution:
– Carrying out a manual analysis of the 15 leading UK banking apps and finding
that they are not vulnerable to TLS flaws previously reported in the literature.
– Discovering a new vulnerability that can arise when certificate pinning is used
incorrectly. We have manually tested for this vulnerability and found it in two of
the apps.
– Identifying “in app phishing” as an issue for apps which establish secure TLS
connections but request resources, such as images and links, via an insecure con-
nection. We found this vulnerability in three iOS banking apps and their Android
counterparts.
– Identifying the existence of vulnerable legacy versions of apps as being an issue
for the Apple App Store, and we have found two vulnerable apps from UK banks
that were still being made available to customers.
– Studying the cryptographic protocol used by one of the banks as a second layer
of security. We found that this protocol is flawed and that an attacker can obtain
the credentials needed to take control of a users’ Internet banking.
– We propose an improved protocol which addresses this problem and formally ver-
ified it using ProVerif.
A summary of the issues found is given in Table 1. For two Android banking apps,
we are able to mount a man-in-the-middle attack that is able to retrieve the user’s
credentials (username and PIN/password), login to the bank and do every operation
the legitimate user can i.e., see the balance and past transactions, make and modify
bank transfers, etc. For three more iOS and Android banking apps, we could inject
our own content and links into the apps, and use this to phish log-in details, and
for two legacy iOS apps we found that we could MITM the TLS connection and so
eavesdrop on the initial setup process of the app. These attacks are very practical. All
an attacker needs to do is to create a “free WiFi” hotspot at a popular co↵ee shop and
run a script that waits for a user to use their banking app, then MITMs the connection
and collects the security tokens and user PIN numbers, which the attackers could then
use at a later date. Through a lengthy disclosure process we have informed all of the
banks involved and all but one have now fixed the problem.
Structure of the paper
In the next section we discuss related work and then we provide some background,
briefly describing the TLS protocol and certificate pinning. Section 3 describes the apps
we tested and the approach we took to our security assessment. Section 4 presents a
novel vulnerability that arises if certificate pinning is used incorrectly. In Section 5 we
perform an in depth analysis of an additional protocol used by one of the apps, and
show that it provides little extra security. Section 6 looks at banking apps which are
vulnerable because they load some of their content over non-TLS connections, and we
give examples of in app phishing attacks against banking apps from Santander and
Allied Irish Bank. We present our improved secure banking protocol in Section 7 and
we conclude in Section 8.
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2 Background and Related Work
2.1 The TLS Protocol
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide con-
fidentiality, integrity and server authentication (with optional client authentication)
to application layer network tra c. To establish a secure connection between a client
and a server, the server must present the client with its public key. This key is usually
encapsulated in an X.509 certificate which also contains other information required to
provide assurance of the authenticity of the key. A certificate includes a CommonName
field and SubjectAltName set, which tie the key to specified hostname(s); a crypto-
graphic signature provided by a CA, usually an RSA encrypted SHA-256 value; and a
valid from date and expiry date. Additional meta-data is also present (see RFC 5280).
In order to be sure that a public key belongs to a given server, client applications
trust a predefined set of root certificates belonging to trusted certificate authorities.
These root CA certificates are carefully selected by the developers of the OS e.g.
Android or iOS, and come pre-installed in the OS. This trust store is then updated as
required by pushing updates to the OS, but can also modified by the user.
When attempting to set up a TLS connection, the server will provide a chain of
certificates so that the user can build up a chain of trust to one of the trusted root
CAs. Such chains typically have a length of three: the server or leaf certificate; which
is signed by the issuer or intermediate CA which is itself signed by a trusted root CA.
To validate a TLS certificate, the client makes the following default checks:
– Validate that each certificate in the chain is signed by the previous one, starting
with the leaf certificate.
– The final certificate in the chain is that of a trusted CA.
– The requested hostname matches the certificate’s CommonName value or is con-
tained within the SubjectAltName set.
– The current date is within the certificate’s valid date range.
Further verifications should also be carried out such as checking the revocation status
of the certificates. However, these are often omitted.
2.2 Certificate Pinning
The trust model that TLS adopts is arguably its biggest weakness. If a single Certificate
Authority is compromised, then valid certificates for any hostname can be produced by
signing them with the compromised CA root certificate. This would enable an attacker
to MITM any TLS connection.
Additionally, an individual user’s trust store could be compromised. There is the
potential for an attacker to trick a user into adding a custom root certificate to their
trust store, for example by suggesting it is a requirement to install a free app. Similarly,
but more alarmingly, [19] showed how malicious apps on rooted Android handsets can
modify the trust store totally unbeknown to the user. Previous work has also exposed
the how bloated trust stores are and identified many root certificates that are unused
[16]. Removing these would reduce the attack surface associated with CA compromise,
however the risk still remains.
6 Tom Chothia, Flavio D. Garcia, Chris Heppel, and Chris McMahon Stone
In order to mitigate these risks, Evans et al. proposed a technique named certificate
pinning [8]. Applicable in situations where the hostname of the server is known in
advance, like connections made by a mobile application, the certificate or public key
that the app expects to see can be fixed. This aims at restricting the trust from all
valid certificate chains originating from root CAs in the trust store, to a specific public
key certificate, or ones derived from a particular fixed certificate. In general there are
two ways this can be implemented:
– Leaf certificate or Public Key - Pin the servers specific public key certificate
which is usually achieved by hard coding it’s fingerprint (typically a SHA-256
value). Alternatively, just the server’s public key can be pinned. The downside of
this type of pinning is reduced flexibility, as the certificate may expire or the use
of a static key may violate key rotation policies. If the certificate changes, users
will be forced to update the application to continue use.
– Intermediary or Root certificate - A specific root CA or intermediary certifi-
cate can be pinned. The server can then re-new its leaf certificate whenever needed
as long as it is signed by the pinned root or intermediary certificate.
2.3 Related Work
Fahl et al. [9] carried out a large scale analysis of Android apps in 2012 and found
widespread misuse of TLS, in particular they found that many apps accepted self-
signed certificates, did not check the hostname they connected too and did not encrypt
some connections at all. Their testing methods would not find the class of vulnerabil-
ities we are dealing with here, as the use of certificate pinning on its own would have
been enough to pass their automated MITM tests. We note that they did not find any
flaws in banking apps.
Georgiev et al. [10] carried out a similar analysis for application and library code
and find similar issues, some of the same authors go on to develop a testing tool [4]
which randomly mutates certificates to look for errors, again this approach would miss
the vulnerabilities we present here, as the test would lack the certificate required by
the pinning.
Reaves et al. [17] reverse engineered banking apps from developing countries and
found a wide range of security issues. We note that while this work did look at banking
apps, the banks involved were not large banks that had invested heavily in security,
and all of the weaknesses could have been found by a competent penetration testing
company. Their analysis involved decompiling the app code to look for vulnerabilities.
This approach might find the code which allowed any hostname however it requires
considerable time and e↵ort to carry out such an analysis and so does not scale. Such
an analysis also breaks the terms and conditions of the app, which as we mention
above is something our analysis method does not do.
Oltrogge et al. [14] performed an extensive study on the applicability of certificate
pinning in mobile apps. A classification method to establish whether an app would
benefit from the use of pinning was applied to over 600,000 Android apps. Developer
feedback was collected from a number of respondents and found that only a quarter
of them grasped the concept of pinning and yet still found it too complex to use. The
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pinning vulnerability presented in this paper is therefore perhaps directly a result of
the complexity of pinning implementations.
Google has developed a testing tool called “nogotofail”1 and there are a range of
similar online checking tools which carry out tests on TLS configurations2 but again,
none of these can detect the lack of hostname verification if certificate pinning is used.
3 Testing Apps
Test set For test cases, this paper focuses on mobile apps from large, leading retail
banks. These types of apps have all the necessary ingredients for a good case study:
– They use TLS.
– They are security critical applications, with well motivated attackers, and large
user bases.
– They often use techniques to provide additional security such as certificate pinning
and two-factor authentication.
– Unlike many other apps, they have been subject to thorough penetration testing,
so avoid basic vulnerabilities.
Additionally, customers of high-street banks are increasingly making use of mobile
apps to manage their finances. A report by the British Bankers Association [1] found
that in 2015 there were 40,000 downloads and 11M logins to UK banking apps per
day. These usage statistics and the sensitive nature of the data that is managed by
these apps, highlights the need to carry out a thorough review of their security.
We chose the top 15 consumer banks that are based in Great Britain or Northern
Ireland. These are all listed in table 1.
Approach The first stage of our investigation was to look for well-known TLS vul-
nerabilities and misuses that have been brought up in past literature. These included
the type of problems that should be detected by penetration tests carried out during
the development of the apps. We looked for:
– Sensitive data sent over insecure channels, using BurpSuite.3
– Basic invalid certificate verification, using Mallodroid4 and BurpSuite. Including:
• Accepting self-signed certificates.
• Not validating that requested hostname matches CommonName value or con-
tained in SubjectAltName set.
– Secure HTTPS links sent over non-TLS connections. Using SSLStrip,5 we proxied
tra c looking for HTTPS links that we could downgrade to HTTP.
– TLS version downgrade vulnerabilities. Many TLS client implementations do not
solely rely on the standard negotiating mechanism. Some will make reconnection
attempts using a downgraded version of TLS if initial handshakes fail. We tested
for this by proxying TLS handshakes
1 https://github.com/google/nogotofail
2 see e.g. https://geekflare.com/ssl-test-certificate/
3 https://portswigger.net/burp/
4 https://github.com/sfahl/mallodroid
5 https://github.com/moxie0/sslstrip
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We found that none of the up-to-date apps in our test set exhibited any of these
vulnerabilites. This led us to explore alternate ways that TLS could be broken or
mis-configured.
Vulnerable Legacy iOS Apps Most of the banking apps we tested required you to
have one of the latest iOS versions. However, as one of our testing devices was an old
iPad running iOS v5, we found some apps that o↵ered to install of the latest version
of the app compatible with your OS. At first glance this sounds reasonable but when
considering security critical applications like banking, this deserves more care.
Concretely, we found that the banking apps from NatWest and the Royal Bank of
Scotland for iOS v5 would accept self-signed certificates. We established this by using
the BurpSuite (without modifying anything on the iOS device) and verified that the
apps would accept BurpSuite’s certificate and establish the connection as usual, but
having BurpSuite as man-in-the-middle. These vulnerabilities have been patched and
are no longer present in the latest version of the apps. However, users who have older
iOS devices are still exposed.
Legacy apps should either be suitably maintained and patched or removed from the
app store in order to avoid compromising user’s security and privacy. Experimenting
with the apps, we found that both apps first asked for registration codes, which would
be delivered to the user out of band. Once entered into the app these codes were sent
over the insecure TLS connection, meaning that they could be captured by an attacker.
Without accounts at either of these banks we were unable to experiment further.
Disclosure: We informed the banks concerned in January 2016, and shortly after
both apps were updated, to no longer accept self-signed certificates.
4 Certificate Pinning Without Hostname Verification
In addition to checking that the server’s certificate has a verifiable chain of trust, it
is essential to check that the requested hostname matches the CommonName field
or is contained in the SubjectAltName set of the X.509 certificate. This however is
an unnecessary step if the leaf certificate or the servers public key is pinned in the
application, since the valid hostname is implicit. On the other hand, if the application is
pinning to a root or intermediary certificate then hostname verification is still required.
Past work in 2012 [9] has demonstrated that incorrect hostname verification is a
mistake that was regularly made by app developers. However, previous analysis of
TLS usage in mobile apps has failed to consider the possibility of incorrect hostname
verification when certificate pinning is in use.
To detect this form of invalid verification in mobile apps, we manually analysed
apps using the following process:
1. Establish if certificate pinning is being used
(a) We add a custom self-signed certificate to the phone’s CA trust store.
(b) We start the apps, one by one, and select the log in option to trigger a TLS
connection attempt.
(c) We observe the network tra c and if the app accepts this certificate in the
handshake, then we know the app is implementing chain of trust verification
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back to a trust store root certificate, if not, then the app must be pinning a
particular certificate or public key.
2. Determine certificate chain in use
(a) From observations made in the previous test, we analyse the certificate chain
provided by the server that the app is communicating with.
(b) Given this information, we can then obtain a certificate for our own domain
from the same intermediary or root CA that the server’s certificate is signed
by.
(c) We then install the newly obtained certificate onto our own TLS server.
3. Check if hostname verification is correctly implemented
(a) The app is then restarted and TLS connection attempts are triggered again.
(b) The TLS tra c is re-directed to our own TLS server and the handshake is
analysed to determine if the hostname is being verified correctly. If so, then
it should reject the TLS connection attempt, and if not, we should observe a
fully successful TLS handshake with encrypted application data being sent by
the app.
For apps that are found to pin a certificate but not check the hostname, an attacker
could go to the CA used by the servers certificate and obtain a valid certificate in their
own name, as we demonstrate in our testing method. The attacker’s certificate can
then be used to Man-in-the-Middle TLS tra c and hence break the security of the
app.
Results: We followed the process described in section 4 for the iOS and Android apps
from the UK banks in our test set. We found apps from two banks in our test set,
Natwest and Co-op, that used certificate pinning but failed to validate the hostame.
While pinning the certificates is a good security measure it seems possible that in
the case of these apps, pinning the certificate hid the more serious problem of having
no hostname verification.
We note that these apps have a collective user-base of up to 5 million people,
illustrating the seriousness and potential for this vulnerability to be exploited by an
attacker. Additionally, this problem did not occur in any of the iOS apps that we
tested which suggests that the iOS API makes it harder for this mistake to be made.
Attack Scenario: This attack could be carried out by an attacker that sets up their
own Wi-Fi hotspot, it could also be carried out by any attacker on the route the data
takes between the victim and the bank, or an attacker on the same network as the
victim, through use of techniques such as ARP or DNS poisoning. Other attacks (e.g.
[11]) have shown that it is sometimes possible to access a home network, and when
combined with these, an attack could performed against anyone in the vicinity.
Disclosure: Both banks have been given over a year to ship fixes for their apps
before we published the issues. We initially contacted Co-op on a Friday, some of their
engineers met with us on the following Monday and they shipped a fixed updated app
by the end of the week. One month later they removed all support for the vulnerable
app and therefore this can no longer be used. A similar process was carried out with
Natwest. We note that Co-op said that they had previously hired two penetration
testing companies to test their apps, both of which had missed this vulnerability, so
they had no reason to believe that their apps were insecure before we contacted them.
10 Tom Chothia, Flavio D. Garcia, Chris Heppel, and Chris McMahon Stone
5 In-depth analysis of a Second Layer Banking Protocol
Breaking the TLS connection of a banking app does not necessarily mean that an
attacker can gain access to a victims account. Given the number of vulnerabilities
that have been found in the TLS protocol [2,7,13], it would make sense for the apps
to implement additional cryptographic protection.
The Co-op app we examined pinned to the Comodo root certificate (instead of
the specific bank’s certificate or the high security EV intermediate certificate). Since
Comodo o↵ers free certificates signed by this root certificate, authenticated only by
e-mail, we were able to obtain a certificate for a domain we owned. Equipped with this
certificate we were able to get the app to establish a TLS connection with us and take
a look at the apps tra c which runs over TLS. We found the app first requested a one-
time registration code, sent to the user out of band, after which it used an additional
cryptographic protocol when the user logs on.
Bank App Server
upgrade check             !
upgrade/fine              
request key             !
Kpub               
generate Ks
pin inputted
Kpub(Ks),GUID,
{PinCode}Ks ...             !
session info.             !
request account info.               
account info.             !
. . . . . .
Fig. 1: A 2nd Level Banking Protocol
Tra c was sent between
the app and the server using
HTTP post requests containing
JSON encoded data. Much of
this included human readable
tags. The first message sent
by the app, and response from
the server checked if the app
needed to be updated. Next,
the app sent a HTTP post
request for an RSAPublicKey.
The app then requested the
user to enter their banking pin
code, and the following two ex-
changed messages are shown in
the appendix.
The forth message includes
a JSON encoded modulus and
exponent, so it seems logical to
conclude this is an RSA key. The 5th message contains a number of fields, of particular
interest is the passcode field, which appeared to be encrypted, and the guid which
appeared to contain the global unique identifier for the app. The twk field is exactly
the right length for a single block of RSA cipher text.
To investigate this further we tried proxying the tra c, and sending our own RSA
public key to the app. Doing so we found that we could then decrypt the twk field
with our private key. This decrypted to 112-bits of correctly padded data. This is the
correct length for two DES keys, and triple DES is a popular encryption algorithm in
the banking community, therefore we tried decrypting the passcode field with these
two keys using triple DES and found our banking PIN code, which was entered to
access the account. Further investigation found that only the GUID and a correctly
encrypted PIN code were needed to access the account, and no other cryptographic
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Banking App Attacker Server
request key                ! request key                !
Generate
Kpub                  
K0pub                    K0pub,K0prv
generate Ks
Get PIN
from user
K0pub(Ks),GUID,{PINCode}Ks                     ! Ks,GUID
PIN Code
Kpub(Ks),GUID,{PINCode}Ks                     !
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 2: A Simple MITM Attack on the banking protocol
verification was required after these messages (although confirmation via SMS message
was required to add new payees).
We summarise the protocol in Figure 1. As shown by our ability to learn the
PIN code this second level protocol is flawed, and therefore does not provide any
additional protection to the communication channel. Figure 2 describes a simple man-
in-the-middle attack against this protocol, in which an attacker can substitute their
own key for the banks. By running this attack, adversaries can learn both the GUID
and the user’s PIN number, which is all they need to login to the user’s account. If
the attacker wants to hide their actions they can continue relaying tra c between the
app and the bank, and store the GUID and the PIN for use at some later date and
some other location.
We additionally found that the bank did not use a fresh RSA key for each session,
in fact for the 2 month period we studied this app, the key was always the same.
This means that an attacker can simply record the tra c from the app and replay the
twk and the passcode fields, to gain access to the victims bank account, at any time,
without ever actually learning the PIN code.
We note that obfuscating the messages would not have improved security, given
the distinct sizes of the cryptography involved, it would have been relatively easy to
reverse engineer this protocol without the human readable tags. What would have
improved security would have been a correct protocol, which was not vulnerable to
MITM and replay attacks, as we propose in Section 7.
Disclosure: We described the problems with this protocol to the Co-op at the same
time as we disclosed the pinning but no hostname vulnerabilities, and we suggested a
secure alternative. The Co-op decided to only fix the TLS vulnerability and leave the
underlying protocol as it was. We note that the use of this underlying protocol does
not represent a vulnerability, but also does nothing to protect the communications
link.
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(a) First Trust Bank Real App (b) First Trust Bank Phishing Attack
(c) Santander Real App (d) Santander Phishing Attack
Fig. 3: In-App Phishing Attacks
6 In-App Phishing Attacks
While examining the banking apps from our test set, we noticed the First Trust Bank,
Santander and Allied Irish Bank apps mixed TLS and non-TLS tra c, requesting some
resources over a secure TLS connection and others over an unprotected connection.
Mixing TLS and non-TLS tra c, does not necessarily make an app vulnerable, so
we examine the app in more detail and found that it was loading adverts for the banks
own products and links to information that may be helpful to its users. In particular,
the app loads an image to be displayed to the user and a link to go to, if the user
clicked on the image.
Figure 3a gives an example of this. The “Help Centre” box in the middle of the
screen on the left was loaded dynamically, and clicking on this takes the user to the
screen on the right. At other times adverts for mortgages and savings accounts were
loaded.
Downloading images and links over unprotected connections allows an attacker,
on the same network as the victim, to replace them with an image and link of their
own choice. This could be used to perform a phishing attack. While phishing attacks
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against banking credentials are common, being able to carry out the phishing attack
inside the actual banking app means that the user is far more likely to trust the link.
We give an example of this in Figure 3b. On the left is a screenshot of the real
banking app, which we connected to a wi-fi hotspot we controlled. As no protection
is used we where able to replace the “Help centre” image with a “Mobile Banking
Log In” image (the real log on option can only be access via the “Banking” icon). We
additionally sent our own link to the app that sends the user to the page shown on
the right of Figure 3b: a page with a spoofed URL which steals the users credentials.
In the case of Santander UK, the image was displayed on the bottom portion of
the screen, e.g. the mortgage panel in Figure 3c. Clicking on this takes the user to a
Santander website. We show a possible in-app phishing attack against this in Figure
3d. The real option to view the users accounts is under the menu at the top right of
the screen, so a large “My Accounts” button with the same logo as the real one will
likely attract many users. Additionally, we found that the information asked for on our
phishing page, on the right of Figure 3d, is all that is needed to install the Santander
UK app on another phone. Again, as the app does not use TLS on the site it links to,
our site’s URL can be spoofed to look like a Santander page to the user.
The Allied Irish Bank app turned out to be very similar to the First Trust Bank,
and we found out that the First Trust Bank is in fact a trading name for Allied Irish.
We additionally found that Allied Irish Bank performs an un-encrypted version check,
which, in the case the app needs updating, the server replies to with a link to the
Android Marketplace. This can be hijacked to redirect the app’s user to any website
of the attackers choice.
Attack Scenario: To perform this attack, the attacker must have the same access
as required for the previous attack. However, for this attack, they do not need a
certificate of their own; as their is no protection on the image and link sent to the
app an attacker can substitute their own image and link. Additionally, the attacker
can spoof the address of the page to make it seem like it belongs to the bank (none
of the apps we found directed users to pages protected with TLS). We emphasise that
the attacker does not need to interfere with the victims phone or the banking app in
anyway, this attack is carried out purely externally.
Some of the apps we looked at did not have a direct log in button on the opening
page of the app. So placing such a button on the first page, with the same look as
the other buttons on the app, would attract a lot of users. For systems that didn’t
require two factor authentication, the users could then be asked for their online banking
credentials, or the information needed to install the banking app on another device,
so giving the attacker full access to the victims online banking.
Disclosure: These vulnerabilities were disclosed to the banks involved in January
2016 and they were fixed the following month. Shortly following this Allied Irish and
First Trust Bank updated their app to a completely new code base, which did not
have these errors.
7 A Secure Protocol for Mobile Banking
We have recently seen many attacks against TLS and we are likely to see more in
the future. These attacks will compromise the security of TLS used in apps (indeed,
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when we first approach one of the banks to say we had discovered a vulnerability, their
first reaction was to ask if it was the POODLE attack, as they were aware that this
had been a problem and had only just fixed it). Additionally, PCI standards on PIN
security state that PINs must be encrypted at all times [15], so it should not be sent
over TLS in the clear if the host receiving it is just going to send them on to another
host to be verified.
In our view this means that TLS should not be the only protection and a lightweight,
second level protocol to protect the PIN number and messages should also be used.
However, as we have shown in Section 5, designing such a protocol appears to be error
prone. In this section we work constructively, proposing a protocol which is suitable
for this purpose and that can be used, freely, by any system designer. The protocol
is a quite straightforward adaptation of an RSA encrypted key transport protocol as
depicted in Figure 4.
Bank App Server
Kpub
upgrade check             !
upgrade/fine              
request nonce              !
Ns 2R 2128
generate Ks,Km
Ns               
Get pin
from user Kpub(Ks,Km,GUID,Ns),
{PinCode}Ks             !
session info.             !
request info,MACKm               
account info,MACKm              !
. . . . . .
Fig. 4: An Improved Secure Banking Protocol
This protocol starts o↵ as
the protocol in Section 5, with
an update check. After that the
user requests and the server
generates a secure random 128-
bit nonce. The banking app
has the public key of the bank
Kpub hard-coded, and this can
be updated automatically by
pushing an app update. This
makes use of a second chan-
nel (the app update process)
to split the public key distri-
bution from the PIN transfer.
During authentication, the app
will generate a session key Ks
and a MAC key Km uniformly
at random, we would recom-
mend AES 128-bit, but 3-DES
may be required for compatibil-
ity with backend banking sys-
tems. When users input their
PIN codes, the app will send an
encryption of the session key, a MAC key, app GUID and a nonce from the server
encrypted with the banks public key: Kpub(Ks,Km, GUID,Ns), along with an en-
cryption of the pincode with the session key Ks (plus potentially any relevant session
information as seen in Section 5). From this point on the app and the server exchange
information in the usual way but authenticating every message with a CBC-MAC
using Km. We pad the PIN and the messages for the CBC-MAC with PKCS5.
Unlike the original protocol, our version includes the GUID in the block that is
encrypted with the banks public key. We note that the session key is 128/112 bits
therefore, when encrypted in the original protocol it will be padded out to 2048 bits.
So in our suggested version of the protocol the GUID and server nonce replaces some of
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this padding, therefore we require no additional encryption and the message becomes
shorter.
We note that this protocol does not keep the session data secret, or prevent message
replays in the same session. This should be done by the application layer and (most of
the time) by TLS. What it does aim to do is to provide protection for the customer that
stops an attacker using their account in the case that the TLS protections fail (which
is unfortunately common e.g. [2,9,13]), in particular it will keep the data needed for
an attacker to log onto the victims account secret, it will prevent replay attacks across
di↵erent sessions, and it will prevent an attacker from altering messages. Furthermore,
it provides this additional protection using a protocol that is slightly shorter and
largely compatible with the original broken version.
Additionally, in the case that TLS fails, an attacker is prevented from distributing
to the victim a version of the app containing their own public key. In Android, app
updates are digitally signed by the app developer and the OS will check that the
update is signed with the same key as the current version of the app.6 In iOS, the
situation is even more robust. App updates are signed by the developer and are then
uploaded to their iTunes Connect account. Apple the verify the update themselves
and then re-sign it with their key before distributing it to customers.7 Upon receiving
app updates, iOS devices will check it is signed by Apple. In both cases, as long as the
underlying signature scheme is not broken, an attacker cannot change the public key
that is used in our proposed protocol.
Formal Analysis of Our Protocol To o↵er assurance that our protocol is correct
we analyse it using the formal protocol analysis tool ProVerif [3]. This uses a simple
language for modelling protocols and can automatically prove a wide range of security
properties, including secrecy, absence of o✏ine guessing attacks, and correspondence
assertions. Because ProVerif uses an automated theorem proving method it can prove
that these properties hold against an active Delov-Yao attacker for an unbounded
number of runs of the protocol and protocol participants, however it may sometimes
fail to terminate, or report false attacks.
The main part of our model is presented is presented in the appendix of the online
version of this paper. In includes an App process to model the smart phone app, and a
Server process that defines a bank process and the entire system is defined on the last
line using the process key word. The system models an unbounded number of banks
that may be using the protocol, each bank has an unbounded number of customers,
some of which may be using the same PIN, but each of which has a unique GUID,
for each customer we run an arbitrary number of App processes representing the user
running the app and Server processes representing the bank handling this particular
user.
We use the ProVerif tool to first check that this protocol keeps the session key
and the PIN code secret, which ProVerif confirms it does. We next check the au-
thentication properties of this protocol, in particular that every time a server fin-
ishes with a particular set of values (a serverFinish(ks,km,guid,pin,bankkey)
event is reached) the app has also run the protocol using the same values, i.e., a
6 https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing.html
7 https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/IDEs/Conceptual/
AppDistributionGuide/MaintainingCertificates/MaintainingCertificates.html
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appInit(ks,km,guid,pin,bankkey) event was reached with the same values as with
the serverFinish event. We also check in the other direction confirming that the
appFinish is always matched by a corresponding serverInit event with matching
values. ProVerif confirms that these correspondences always hold indicating that an
attacker cannot impersonate one side of the protocol or interfere with any of the values
used, without being detected. Finally, as the PIN code may be a low entropy secret we
check if an attacker can perform an o✏ine guessing attack to find it, using ProVerif’s
weaksecrect test and a second model that uses a fixed PIN code. ProVerif confirms
that no such guessing attack exists.
8 Conclusion
We have carried out an extensive security analysis of TLS implementations in the
UK’s major banking mobile applications. We have discovered a new vulnerability in
2 of these banking apps that arises due to a misuse of certificate pinning. We have
shown how to detect this vulnerability dynamically and without reverse engineering
the app. In doing so, we have demonstrated how this vulnerability could be exploited
by an attacker to break the security of the app and eavesdrop sensitive information.
We have also found apps that are vulnerable to phishing attacks, legacy apps that
accept self-signed certificates and a broken second layer banking protocol.
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A Co-op app tra c
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: webserver
X-response-id: -907159463
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
Cache-control: no-cache no-store
Content-type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 311
{"modulus":"9C8C54XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 4082C1","exponent":"3","keyVersion":"81XXXXXX
C1"}
POST /mrs/3/security/session HTTP/1.1
user-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 4.4.2; XT1021 Build/KXC20.82-14)
AppleWebKit /537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/30.0.0.0 Mobile
Safari/537.36
client-version: 4.4.2
X-Request-Id: -907159453
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Cookie: JSESSIONID=9f7b4441e12b265fde33d1f0e73b; Path=/mrs; Secure
Cookie: JROUTE=9qIW.9qIW; Path=/mrs; Secure
Content-Length: 577
Connection: Keep-Alive
{"msisdn":"44XXXXXXXXXX","clientType":"|2.2.7||motorola|XT1021|Android|4.4.2|
|","passcode":"93XXXXXXXXXXXX07","twk":"8170b6XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXabf54c",
"pinLength":"6","guid":"d2xxxxxxxxxxxxxx83","applicationName":"Coop",
"deviceID":"44XXXXXXXXXX","issuerName":"COOP","authenticationType"
:"passcode","clientVersion":"2.2.7","rootDetection":"NOT_DETECTED"}
Fig. 5: Messages sent between the app and bank (with some information blanked out)
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